THEY DON'T MAKE 'EM LIKE THEY USED TO

Strikes, that is.

Unlike the storied 67-day 1970 strike of General Motors (GM), the "general strike" of 2007 ended with a whimper after only a couple of days. Under the cover of darkness, somebody blinked, resulting in GM and the United Auto Workers reaching a tentative agreement.

It's an abbreviated denouement for negotiations that UAW prexy Ron Gettelfinger claimed merely two quick rotations of the Earth ago were "one-sided."

Ostensibly, the strike of 2007 was about guarantees of future products at U.S. plants. Yet according to press reports "GM made no specific commitments to build cars and trucks at U.S. factories, but generally agreed that with the reduced costs from the new contract, investment in the plants would work . . . ."

Still, the strike ended after only the briefest of furloughs.

Likely none of GM's striking workers (which, by the way, numbered hundreds of thousands fewer than those participating in the protracted 1970 work stoppage) missed any mortgage or car payments. No children starving on a meager $200 per week strike benefit. No product shortages or stock collapse. Virtually no pain. Except for the shifts that had to show up Monday for the dramatic "job walk-off," it was really nothing more than a long weekend.

Instead of "burning down Detroit," the mini-strike was more like "flicking a Bic at a rock concert." Sure there was the risk of a fire, but nothing meaningful was actually consumed.

Before and during the mini-strike, many industry analysts opined the strike was about conditioning the UAW rank and file to vote for give-backs. Afterward, Mr. Gettelfinger boasted "I think the strike probably helped our side more than theirs."

Yet GM reportedly wrangled a tiered wage structure, "mitigated" the effects of the ridiculous "job bank" (wherein furloughed UAW members get paid for not working), and off-loaded over FIFTY BILLION in "legacy" obligations onto the UAW for nearly a $20 Billion discount.

None of this required a strike to achieve.

The celebrated Volunteer Employee Benefit Association (VEBA), if approved by the rank and file and the government, raises a bundle of questions. Undoubtedly, if it goes poorly (i.e. the UAW cannot hand off its new obligations to a "HillaryCare" bailout, or investments go bad, or costs continue to skyrocket), the UAW will be back in four years (or sooner) for more GM money. Thus, some question whether this really changes things much. How a VEBA results in lower health care costs is unknown. But with a VEBA outsourcing the hard decisions to the union, perhaps GM counts on not facing as much of a backlash from future benefit reductions.

Whatever the result, the UAW is transforming itself into one whale of an insurance company . . . .

As a historical event, this puny strike bookends the smashmouth 1970 walkout in that both touched on the problem of retirement. The 1970 contract included a new pension plan. This one apparently results in the retirees getting a pension increase that's "offset by an equal increase in health care contributions." It's emblematic of the UAW's decline in power over the past thirty years. It is unlikely that this abbreviated "show strike" will do anything to help the UAW organize the transplants and "level the playing field" for the Detroit 3.

Thus, to some, it seems like a rearrangement of the chairs with little prospect for fundamental change. Apparently neither side had the stomach to drive a harder bargain. Whether the pattern contract of 2007 will make Detroit more competitive remains to be seen.

"AUTOMOTIVE ENNUI" AND THE 500 HORSEPOWER FORD

As most auto-wonks breathlessly contemplate the billions General Motors (GM) will lose if the strike lasts more than 72 hours, or the billions Ford Motor Company (F) could make with its new Chinese factory (all the while U.S. F-Series production being temporarily idled at another plant), the Wall Street Journal's Joseph B. White focuses our attention on a more fundamental and philosophical problem in the auto world. In an article entitled "Seeking a Cure for Automotive Ennui" (September 24, 2007; Page D2), White argues that "Boredom May Be a Factor" in the current "sales slump."

In support of his thesis, he lambasts the rehashed, Microsoft Sync-equipped, 2008 Ford Focus (tested in Ford-hating Seattle, no less) with an amorphous, diesel powered Honda Civic i-CTDi, eggmobile from Europe (imported -- and undoubtedly show-car prepared -- as a publicity stunt by the crafty Honda PR Department).

Predictably, White hates the Focus ("The Focus is competent, relatively inexpensive for an American-made car, and will be toast when Chinese auto makers figure out how to design a vehicle that will pass a U.S. crash test. . . .") and gushes over the Honda ("The Euro-diesel Civic is more fun to look at than most American small cars. . . . Slide into the first of the manual transmission's six forward gears, and the thing lunges like a shark that skipped lunch.")

Of course, White fails to point out the huge disparity in price between the "can't-buy-it-here" oil-burner Honda and the prosaic gasoline Focus.

Curiously, White picks on the Focus instead of wailing on more popular (and trend setting) made-for-America bordom-sleds, such as the chart-topping Toyota Camry (which, from the standpoint of flabby driving dynamics, flaccid performance, and nondescript appearance, may be the most "boring" car sold in America). Apparently it's more fun to kick a dog (like FoMoCo) when it's down . . . .

White's anecdotes are pressed into serve his larger point that the U.S. car market suffers from a sort of conservative malaise driven by our national and local (e.g. California) regulatory policy:

"It seems clear that the European approach to the issue of automobiles and energy efficiency -- which combines high fuel taxes with tax policies aimed at promoting innovation in small displacement powertrains -- is working better than the haphazard American Way."

White's general indictment is apparently predicated upon idea that only fuel efficient cars matter.

He wholly ignores the incredible array of high performance vehicles currently sold in America, such as the 500-horsepower Shelby GT500, and Chrysler L.L.C.'s street-ripping SRT lineup

Even though many are missing the "second supercar era" as a result of insane price escalation, dealer greed (especially Ford dealer gouging on the GT500) and limited supplies, arguably this is one of the most exciting and diverse periods in automotive history -- at least for high performance enthusiasts.

Speedzzter wonders how "bored" Mr. White would be whipping a 500-horse Shelby or 425-horse SRT-8 around on the twisting roads of the Puget Sound area. . . . However, given his suggestion that the current advanced, high-output engines are as interesting as "music from lacquer records that had been refined to hold 100 minutes of songs," perhaps his sensibilities are as "atrophied" as the neck muscles of Tom and Ray Magliozzi (a/k/a "Click and Clack," the Tappet Brothers).

White, however, does make (or perhaps unintentionally brush by) a few good points.

1. The American fixation on Corporate Average Fuel Economy without regard to functionality has grossly distorted the American vehicle market. Traveling further down that road (as the U.S. Senate and the greeniacs desire) will likely plunge us back into the far more "boring" days of the 1970s.

2. Torque is king in making a small car fun to drive. The Focus gave up over 100 lbs/ft of torque to the euro-diesel Honda, which played prominently in the gratis paean to the Nippon-Continental egg-wagon. Performance still sells--even to the appliance motorist-- when it's unobtrusively packaged.

3. Unlike the heady days when the brilliant (albeit underpowered), late SVT Focus scored on Car and Driver's snooty "10 Best" list, the current U.S. Focus has been neglected and de-contented into a tepid, uninspiring commodity car. The decade-long Jac Nasser-Bill Ford failure to invest in small car niches continues to rain down mediocrity on the American market.

4. Our growing patchwork of local environmental regulations (e.g. California and the like-minded Blue States) has deprived the U.S. of some of the best cars available over on the Continent and has unintentionally hurt overall fleet fuel economy. Undoubtedly the European Union's mania over "greenhouse gas" emissions may someday level this field. But thus far, many of the best cars balancing usable performance with fuel frugality are trapped on the other side of the Atlantic. Parochial environmental waivers and excessive regulations are expensive restraints on competition and innovation, yielding fewer choices.

5. The crushing burden of paying United Auto Workers "legacy" costs and unrealistic wage structures has depleted the Detroit 3's resources for making world class small cars. While Mr. White doesn't articulate this point, one look at the "boring" 2008 Focus and his dismissive road test review clearly suggest that Ford's resources are otherwise occupied. Meanwhile foreign manufacturers, whom the UAW have not saddled with punitive $25+ per worker-hour "tariffs," have folded more resources into improving their products and keeping them fresh.

A point Mr. White SHOULD have made-- and possibly would have if he hadn't been so star-struck with the hideous HondaEGG-- is that much of the current boredom and conservatism in design is driven by the presumed necessities of aerodynamic styling.

Yet even as he attacks the clichés of the near-luxury niche, he simply ignores unique and dynamic American contributions to current vehicular fashion, such as Cadillac's origami-in-steel "Art and Science" themes or Chrysler's chopped-top, neoclassic 300. Obviously, a Ford Mustang is apparently a Mustang, even without the badges. Nor is a Mustang hardly "essentially interchangeable" with other cars and trucks costing less than $40,000. Thus, he overstates his point on uniformity somewhat.

But his point is well taken that most of the mass-market "appliance cars" of the current design vernacular blend together in the popular consciousness as homogenized blobs.

Although he doesn't note it, Mustang, notwithstanding its iconic distinctiveness, has suffered from some recent sales downturns. But the "boredom" with Mustang is that Ford hasn't developed a better balance of high performance, fuel efficiency, and aftermarket "tuneability" at mass-market price point. Instead they foster the GT500 dealer gouge-fest, leavened with unsatisfactory substitutes and overpriced posers such as the Shelby GT. Nor has Ford sufficiently addressed important niches, such as the youth market or the "four-cylinder tuner scene."

But draconian fuel taxes and other Euro-style, "top down" edicts as Mr. White apparently longs for are not the answer.

Unfettered competition, better fuels (such as high octane E-85) and increased resources for development of competitive models will produce better choices and greater, market-sustained advances. After all, iPods didn't supplant compact discs (and compact discs unseat vinyl L.P.s) at the behest of some "top down" government edict.

Competition, Mr. White. It works when it's tried.

IT’S ON– THE UAW DECIDES TO BURN DOWN WHAT’S LEFT OF DETROIT

For the first time since 1976, the United Auto Workers have called a national strike of a unionized automaker. Unable to agree with General Motors (GM) over job guarantees and off-loading the crushing burden of "Cadillac-style" health benefits into a union-run VEBA trust* while tying future benefits to rational market conditions, the UAW has gone on strike.

[*Update: "UAW President Ron Gettelfinger said that job security was the top unresolved issue, adding that the talks did not stumble over [the Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Association trust proposal]"]

Given the tenuous state of the Detroit 3, a strike is akin to the "nuclear option."

Detroit cannot survive by giving up an estimated $25/hour labor advantage to the non-union Japanese/transplant automakers. Yet UAW intractability has seemingly brought the portion of the industry it manhandles to the brink.

Undoubtedly, the Japanese will "make hay while the sun shines" and seize more marketshare from the domestics during the strike. In the long run, this adversarial relationship will destroy more and more jobs at the Detroit 3. And the UAW will likely remain impotent to spread its myopic vision of labor utopia among the transplants.

All of this makes Detroit less competitive.

Something’s got to give. And that "something"should be the UAW.

Sadly, they’ve decided to torch what’s left of Motown instead.

STOP THE CORONATION! ROUSH-FENWAY MAKES IT A RACE FOR THE CUP.

Given the abysmal roll-out of Ford’s version of NASCAR’s "Car of Tomorrow," and the huge numerical advantage for GM in the Made-for-TV "Chase for the Nextel Cup," savvy NASCAR pundits gave Roush-Fenway Ford drivers Matt Kenseth and Carl Edwards little chance of stopping a boring Chevy runaway.

Yet at Dover, Roush-Fenway FINALLY showed signs of life in the COT era. Carl Edwards won going way. And Matt Kenseth dominated the event, until his Yates-Roush Ford V8 blew up in the waning stages. Meanwhile, all of GM’s usual suspects (including Hendrick drivers Jeff Gordon and Jimmy Johnson, Gibbs drivers (a/k/a future Toyota traitors) Tony Stewart and Denny Hamblin, DEI’s Martin Truex, Jr. and RCR’s Kevin Harvick) all struggled.

It’s only one race of ten, but Carl Edwards is leading the points (as well as in the Busch Series) and may yet become a "fly in the ointment" for GM’s presumed Nextel Cup triumph.

It’s been a tough couple of days for the GM faithful . . . .

BUT GM'S HAVING A BETTER WEEK THAN FOMOCO'S JOHN FORCE

Force was injured in a wild second-round shunt with Kenny Bernstein at Sunday's NHRA O'REILLY NATIONALS in Ennis, TX.

According to Force's website:

"Doctors updated John Force’s family and team following a thorough evaluation of his multiple injuries and the prognosis for a full recovery is very good. Force sustained a broken left ankle and severe abrasion on his right knee. Force’s left wrist also was dislocated and broken and he sustained some severe abrasions and slight fractures on a number of fingers on his right hand."

With the death of Eric Medlen and now this, 2007 has been an abysmal year for John Force Racing.

Speedzzter's thoughts and prayers are with the Force family.

BOSS LOSS? SOMEBODY’S WRONG ON FORD’S BIG V8

A "hurricane storm surge" of speculation has surrounded the notorious "Ford Experimental" V8 displayed under the hood of the Roush Engineering/Don Bowles Mustang at Michigan’s Milan Dragway.

Roush is using Bowles’ National Mustang Racing Association Open Comp Roush Mustang for severe duty testing of this "experimental" engine. Based on the low 9-second elapsed times posted, automotive journalists have estimated the "experimental" engine’s output at 800 naturally-aspirated horsepower.

Virtually everyone who has ventured a guess has assumed this "experimental" mill is a development mule for the new "Boss" production engine.

Michael Galimi provides additional speculation in the November 2007 issue of Muscle Mustangs and Fast Fords("MMFF"). In a minor cover story entitled "Alternative Gas, Experimental Power," Galimi reports:

"Our source in Detroit tells us it’s 7.0 liters (about 427 ci), and can go as big as 7.5 liters. We also hear it has favorable 4.250 inch bores, and from that we can calculate that the stroke is roughly 3.75 inches, offering nice revability. As for the heads, we hear the valves are laid out in a Hemi-style configuration, and we think there’s a camshaft in the block and some pushrods in there."

SOMEBODY’S WRONG.

Speedzzter strongly hopes that Galimi’s "source in Detroit" is as phony as a room full of Elvises. The photographic details suggest as much.

FIRST, unlike common, old-school pushrod engine practice (but exactly like a modular OHC V8), the valve covers clearly extend a couple of inches over the front timing cover. This strongly suggests a camshaft over each bank of cylinders. It would be wholly unneccessary for a cam-in-block engine.

Second., a glimpse of blue paint in front of the "experimental" air box shows a deep, modular-style valley between the cylinder banks. Given that recent cam-in-block designs (Speedzzter will not call any pushrod engine "modern") position the camshaft high in the block for better valvetrain geometry and lighter valvetrain weight, the deep valley strongly contra-indicates a pushrod design (unless it's hopelessly out-of-date).

Third, the deep setback of the intake in relation to the front of the valve covers is substantially more indicative of an OHC than a cam-in-block pushrod engine.

Fourth, the spark plugs apparently do not run down the middle of the cylinder heads as would be expected with a true hemispherical combustion chamber.

Fifth, the width of the valve covers seems to be substantially less than any "hemi" with a 4.2+ inch bore. While the valve covers are wide enough for some splaying of the valves, the valve angles would need to be far narrower than a true "hemi" design (or extremely short) to fit within the modest valve covers of the "experimental engine." On the other hand, the valve covers appear well within the width parameters of an OHC.

Sixth, based on the relationship of the engine to the shock towers, the engine is too wide to be a pushrod powerplant with a mere 7.5 liter maximum capacity.

Thus, a number of possibilities present themselves:

A. MMFF and their "source in Detroit" are wrong, and the "experimental" engine is an wide-bore center OHC modular V8!
B. MMFF and their "source in Detroit" are correct on the disappointingly low-tech specifications of the new "Boss" . . . and the "experimental" engine is something other than a new Boss prototype.

C. MMFF and their "source in Detroit" are correct and Ford Motor Company (F) has decided once again to "reinvent the wheel" for no reason.

THE ONLY THING REALLY WRONG WITH THE CURRENT MODULAR V8s IS BORE CENTER SPACING.

As has been reported ad nauseam, the Modular V8 was unnecessarily compromised by narrow bore centers. This limits the expansion capacity of the current Modular V8 family. Although FoMoCo should have learned this lesson with the FE-series, Ford’s engine shop narrowed the Modular’s bore centers for anticipated use in front wheel drive vehicles. But except for the underwhelming and mostly forgotten FWD Continental, the Modular has been a RWD powerplant, and the narrow bore centers have prevented Ford from building the 350-430 cubic inch V8s necessary to be competitive au natural with GM’s LSx and Chrysler’s Gen III Hemi.

Of course, unless restricted by archaic rules packages (e.g. NASCAR, NHRA), limited engine compartment space or hide-bound tradition (GM LSx), no "clean sheet" engine designer would engineer any new engine with pushrods or a cam-in-block design.

Fordophiles have been patiently waiting since the abortive S.O.H.C. 427 of the 1960s for a big-cube OHC/DOHC engine. Merely enlarging the bore centers of the 5.4 Modular would suffice. The 5.4 Modular has ample stroke capability and fits within the engine compartments of virtually all modern RWD Ford products.

• A wide-bore-center Modular would immediately make GM’s LSx and Chrysler’s Hemi appear obsolete. (Such engines are only kept alive in motorsports by antique rules packages and lack of factory-backed alternatives)
• A wide-bore-center Modular would set the stage for huge four (or more) valve high-performance cylinder heads that could "rev" and breathe better than any old-fashioned two-valver ever conceived.
• A wide-bore-center Modular would establish Ford as technologically head-and-shoulders above their Detroit competitors. It would also promise domination of the 7-liter classes in progressive and open forms of motorsports.

But if MMFF and their "source in Detroit" are correct, Ford is absolutely wrong!

Developing yet another incompatible pushrod V8 family is a huge mistake. While bringing an updated Windsor/Cleveland architecture back to production would have a few advantages, starting from scratch to build an incompatible LS/Hemi clone eliminates most of them.

There’s simply no reason to change such well-established Windsor "hard points" as the bore centers and head/bellhousing bolt patterns if all Ford wants is another me-too pushrod engine in the 7 liter range. Developing hemi heads, variable valve timing, and a modern cross-bolted, deep-skirt "NVH" block for the Windsor would suffice (and be far cheaper than starting over again).

While a clean-sheet pushrod engine might satisfy a dying breed of antediluvian luddites who refuse to see the inherent advantages of OHC designs, it would set back American engine design at least a generation. It would also further feed the popular notion that America cannot compete on the world stage (Other than for NASCAR, how many pushrod engines have been developed over the past twenty years by any OEM outside Detroit?)

Of course Ford has a history of needlessly starting over on incompatible (or mostly incompatible) V8 engine families (Flathead, Y-block, FE/FT, MEL, Windsor, 385-series, Cleveland, 335-series, Modular (Romeo and Windsor versions), Yamaha) . This inability to stick with important retrofit "hard points" has hamstrung the acceptance and development of Ford engines for grassroots motorsports for more than fifty years.

Another pushrod V8 would unnecessarily overlap with Ford’s existing pushrod V8 families and create more confusion than it would be worth. It would unnecessarily divide development resources at both the factory and aftermarket levels between essentially similar architectures. A OHC/DOHC Boss, however, would firmly plant Ford in the future.

Let’s all hope that MMFF and their "source in Detroit" are wrong.

Dead wrong.