FORD MOTOR COMPANY TEAMS WITH BRANDINTEL TO FERRET OUT CONSUMER FEEDBACK.
According to Advertising Age magazine, "Ford Motor Co. wants unvarnished consumer comment. So it is monitoring Internet chatter about its brands." "Last month, Ford hired BrandIntel, a marketing analysis company in Toronto, to track what Web users are saying about the styling and performance of its cars and trucks."

To cynics familiar with the FoMoCo behemoth, the Edsel immediately comes to mind.

The Edsel was purportedly based on extensive "market research." It was hoped to help transform FoMoCo into the segment-based divisional mold of GM.

But as history shows, the plan failed on multiple levels.

Sure, external forces helped doom the Edsel. A recession and steel price jump in 1958 hurt the entire domestic auto industry. Growing interest in compact cars hurt sales of large, mid-range cars. And the GM-style brand hierarchy was collapsing as value-added smaller cars (such as the Ford Thunderbird) and high performance sport models (i.e. Pontiac Bonneville, Chevrolet Impala) were breaking the link between size and price.

But a key reason the Edsel failed is because all of the "market research" didn't produce a better car.

To be fair, Ford Motor Company and its hired gun BrandIntel would probably claim that 1950's-style market research is different from the "unvarnished" feedback Ford is now seeking.

But is it?

Didn't focus group consumers just glow over the futuristic GM "Dustbuster" minivans, only to abandon them in the marketplace? Didn't the 1996 Ford Taurus team have reams of positive customer impressions about the "fishmobile" styling to offset internal concerns about the new design?

And how will BrandIntel filter the firehose of world wide web feedback? How will it find nuggets among the noise and chaos? How will it determine expertise?

A statistical approach is geared toward producing blandness. Which is apparently okay if you're Toyota. But blandness is a rut Ford cannot afford to travel at this point.

The legendary automobilists -- Henry Ford, Edsel Ford, Dr. Ferdinand Porsche, Enzo Ferrari, Carroll Shelby and many others -- didn't have "unvarnished" feedback when they created milestone automobiles. Instead they had a clear targeted vision of improving the automobile in specific, measurable ways.

But on the odd chance BrandIntel and Ford Motor Company are listening, Speedzzter will make a few "unvarnished" suggestions:

1. Regardless of what consumers say, they want it all and they don't want to pay (extra) for it.

Obviously, the first company that could build a 40 m.p.g. supercar with a huge trunk, easy access to all seats, swoopy styling with "attitude" (but not weirdness), a three second 0-60 m.p.h. time and a Corvette-beating top speed, inability to get stuck in the snow, a cushiony ride with razor-sharp reflexes and Nurburgring-quality handling on demand, a sporty-yet-commanding driver's position, bulletproof reliability, total safety, scores of electronic entertainment gadgets (i-pod plug ins, DVD/Blu-Ray players, navigation systems), sybaritic luxury, and an elegant, sporting image-- all at the price point of a new Camry-- would OWN the market . . . .

Suffice it to say, this fantasy car isn't possible under current technology. But it points to the obvious -- that consumers measure "value" on an affective, not objective, basis.

Japanese cars are selling because a large number of consumers believe them to be a better, more reliable product. These perceptions are based on the weakest of data (self-selected Consumer Reports surveys, word-of-mouth anecdotes and mostly irrelevant tactile perceptions of non-mechanical materials and assembly "quality") But as Tom Peters once observed "perception is reality."

So to beat Toyota, Ford has to keep in mind that consumers "want it all and they don't want to pay for it" by adding perceived value and then hawking the daylights out of it in comparative advertising and other "competition."

2. Opinion leaders matter.

Most consumers are lemmings.

Consequently most product loyalty these days is tied to the opinions and experiences of local "experts" (family members, co-workers, etc.) Moreover, a whole generation of "non-car guy" consumers have been inoculated against Fords and other Detroit brands by exposure to poor-performing, unreliable, ex-fleet used cars or other bland, uncompetitive small cars. Then they have heard smug criticism from their local "expert" evangelists for the imported brands, who tout import superiority ad nauseam. Mix in a healthy dose of "Car and Driver Ten Best" and "Motor Trend Car of the Year" and the "appliance motoring" customers are primed for conquest. Unfairly, they tend to compare worn-out, used Detroit cars with shiny, new imports at the new car store. Then they learn just how depressed trade-in values are for used-up American cars . . . . And another potential customer is lost.

Changing these results rests in no small part on changing the minds of the opinion leaders-- both locally and nationally.

Nationally, to win the hearts of jaded automobile writers and other opinion leaders, it's important for new vehicles in a segment to be head-and-shoulders above competitors in objective testing on memorable parameters, such as fuel economy, acceleration, braking and handling.

"Head and shoulders above" isn't just a tenth of a second here or there. It's a smashmouth blowout!

Subjective factors are important too, such as the feel of the switch gear, the quality of the interactive parts of the vehicle (door handles, shifter, the sound of the door closing, steering feedback, ergonomics, the materials in sight of the driver etc.). But bang-for-the-buck is still the benchmark among national opinion leaders.

Locally, to win the hearts of "experts," the cars have to be durable, easy to service, cheap to maintain and have a "must have" reputation on the street.

Fords have built a couple of generations of cars that weren't really any of these things. For example, until recently, Fords have developed a reputation for electrical and cooling system problems, based on poor design choices made during the halcyon days of the 1980s. And any mechanic who struggled to replace the heater core in an old air-conditioned Fox-body model (step one: remove the dashboard) isn't very likely to recommend Ford products.

The challenge for Ford Motor Company is to make all systems durable enough to last for 200,000 miles of ordinary, non-competitive driving with nothing more than routine maintenance. And the cars have to be built with sufficiently inherent quality to make a good impression on young, impressionable used car customers who will end up with them five to seven years later.

That's a tough order.

3. Show confidence in the product.

The Koreans have managed to sell a slew of inferior motorcars by slapping eye-popping warranties on them. A 100,000 mile warranty is about the minimum buy-in to register in the psyches of the consumer. But sell it, Ford would have to be frank--"we couldn't afford to offer this if we thought you'd need it."

4. Build "Transparent Performance."

It's no coincidence that many ordinary sedans perform as well or better than the average musclecar of the 1960s. Remember, most folks want it all, but without all the hassles. Transparent performance is the ability to hit milestone objective numbers without excessive noise, cost, maintenance or intrusions into functionality. Power-to-weight is the holy grail here. Even in the era of environmental "awareness" (if not hysteria), a "hot" (yet still practical) car that also gets good mileage will sell better than a slow, boring, "socially responsible"one.

5. Exploit the natural "Trickle Down" of technology.

The revolutionary trend in all of technology is in "downsizing"it and democratizing it. Computers used to fill whole rooms, now they fill your hand. DOHC and fuel injection were once the province of Formula One. Now they're in the cheapest Korean car. Thus, aiming high and pulling meaningful technology down to the masses is a time-tested formula for success. Even Henry Ford's Model T started initially with the goal of providing the "bang" (power, durability) of a more expensive car as a price ordinary farmers could afford. A couple of decades later, Ford's 1932 V8 captured the minds and hearts of a generation of enthusiasts because it put elite-class performance capability in the hands of ordinary Joes.

But the Japanese are currently doing a much better job at this now. For example, Honda's celebrated V-TEC variable cam phasing and timing has generated a huge, positive reputation for the dynamic range and fuel economy of Honda's engines among opinion leaders. Meanwhile, the accountants running Ford have mostly kept such technologies out of Fords in the same market segments. And Ford has the failed legacy of such low-tech bombs as the 2.3 pushrod Tempo still to overcome in the minds of consumers.

Even GM and Chrysler are somewhat ahead of Ford. GM and Chrysler both offer cylinder deactivation on V8s. Ford doesn't. GM and Chrysler both have high-tech turbocharged fours in some models. Ford doesn't.

The current battleground is in making efficiency technology cheaper and more accessible. For example, given current technology, there's no reason why anyone should have to buy a code scanner to diagnose their car.

Nor are there valid technical reasons why forced induction shouldn't be used to expand the dynamic range of engines (Think direct-injected VW twin-charger here). Yet Ford's record with such trickle down technologies is spotty at best. Even in premium brands, such as Jaguar, Ford hasn't consistently delivered market-leading technologies at better price points.

As AVIS's time-tested ad slogan from the 1960's pointed out, when you're behind, you have to "try harder." And trickle-down technology is one way to do this.

6. Benchmarks matter.

You beat the best by competing with the best. Picking the wrong target insures that the result will be "me-too" bland. Ford's failure to lead with "trickle down" technologies is the direct result of shooting too low. While 99.9% of customers will never use an Autobahn-rated vehicle to its potential, the qualities necessary to build one resonate in the minds of even unsophisticated consumers.

Of course most of the people who buy expensive high-performance footwear never step foot on a basketball court either. It's the affective image that sells the product.

Money spent on brakes, cooling systems, suspension tuning and active safety systems is always a good investment.

7. Practical flash.

The only things worse than a lukewarm designs are unnecessarily weird ones and unfunctionally bad ones. The latest Chrysler 300 was a modest hit because it blended practicality with a daringly different look. The 300 also played to America's thirst for updated, athletic, RWD V8-available vehicles.

The original Taurus did some of the same things (and it "trickled down" advanced Audi 5000 styling to the mass market). The original Taurus also contained many "ah ha" features, such as the four sunvisors, the European-style HVAC controls and a massive trunk. It paid attention how people actually used their cars and delivered more than promised (except perhaps in the areas of handling and engine performance).

The 1996 Taurus, however, had lost most of this. It substituted weirdness for innovation. Most of the "ah ha" was cut, along with the trunk space. And even in the engine room, many potential customers only experienced dated, non-Duratec power. The blandness of the rental car experience, along with damage to reliability and resale (both seemingly inherent consequences of the (non-Shelby GT) rental car market) killed demand.

(One wonders if Ford had flooded the rental market with special, regular-fuel, SHO-style Tauruses-- for rent at the regular Taurus price -- whether Ford might have induced more retail demand).

The Five Hundred appears to be an overreaction to the flaws of the 1996 Taurus. Conservative to the point of blandness. Poor objective performance numbers. No V8s or forced induction to generate objective flash or subjective thrills. Merely competent in a hyper-competitive age when competence isn't enough.

Bunkie Knudsen, for all his faults, had it correct--you can sell a young man's car to an old man but you can't sell a old man's car to a young man. Style matters, but it cannot be at the expense of functionality.

8. Diversity.

Team Japan has cleaned the clock of Dearborn because they have offered much more diversity in small cars.

Until the 1980s, Ford's U.S. operations ignored the demand for practical four-door sedans in the subcompact class. And even now, Ford has restricted small car offerings. Mitsubishi, for example, has small, cheap economy cars as well as its legendary EVO for sale in America. Although Honda offers less performance diversity than Ford, it has been aggressive with hybrids. Toyota's Scion brand sells multiple body styles. In contrast, Ford has mostly ignored these niches with its U.S. Focus franchise. And its only niche player here--the ST 170 a/k/a SVT Focus arrived a day late and a turbocharger short to capture anyone's imagination.

In midsize cars, diversity also matters. Since 1998, Ford has ignored the small but style-leading midsize coupe market, allowing Toyota's Solara and GM's FWD coupes nearly free reign. And Ford has also ignored the midsize convertible niche, as well as cutting back on station wagons.
Except for the Mustang, the Panthers and trucks, Ford has avoided RWD--notwithstanding its driveability and prestige advantages. Even when Ford had a couple of competent RWD platforms available (DEW 98 and the OZ Falcon) Ford chose not to develop new products off of them.

9. Made in the USA still matters.

Why is it that Mazda can build Mazda 6s in Flatrock, Michigan, but Ford has to build Fusions in Mexico? With Toyota adding jobs in the U.S. at a breathtaking pace, it's poised to win the "Who's more American" battle for perceptions.

Simply put, an American car company needs to design and build (or at least assemble) cars in America. While Ford's crushing health care and legacy obligations are a tough nut to crack, the nationalistic psychology of building cars in the U.S. cannot be jetisoned without adverse consequences to loyalty.

10. Features, Features, Features.

Why can't Ford offer the following features:

a. A performance "volume" knob that lets the driver dial in the balance of fuel economy and performance (just like the volume knob on the radio).

b. Turbocharged (or twin charged) V8s with cylinder deactivation--Since 1932, no one has been more identified with V8 power than Ford. Yet Ford is falling further behind in this niche.

c. Magnetically-adjustable shock absorbers. Shocks are the most important variable in ride control. The ability to adjust on-the-fly with computer-controlled algorithms favorably exploit the balance between ride and handing. Sophisticated packages could even help actively manage some weight transfer effects on acceleration, braking and high-g cornering.

d. A restyled Panther with more power and more economy. Nine years without restyling is too long. And failing to offer a mild-hybrid and 32-valve engines (or at least 24 valve V8s) is simply market neglect.

e. The Interceptor concept. Not everyone who wants Mustang levels of performance and driveability can fit into a Mustang. As BMW proved thirty-years ago, a practical sports sedan will be popular if its practical, reasonably stylish and generates competitive hard numbers. Given that BMW has abandoned the lower-end of the sports sedan market, the pickings are ripe for a four-door "Mustang"-type car (and not half-hearted efforts like the 1985 LTD LX or the 2003-2004 Marauder).

f. A Focus-sized RWD. Sure, AWD is great. But it's complex, heavy and hard to work on. What no one has produced in years is a simple, sporty subcompact RWD sedan/coupe/wagon. A small, nimble RWD would become an instant icon because of its appeal for grassroots motorsports and to opinion leading small car enthusiasts. With RWD, FWD and AWD in small cars, Ford would potentially have the market covered.

g. Proven efficiency technologies. Cylinder deactivation, variable intake tuning (a/k/a the V6 SHO Taurus, SVT Focus and the OZ Falcon 6), variable cam lift, timing and phasing, gear-splitting overdrives (permitting eight or more forward speeds), electric power steering and air conditioning and 42-volt starter-alternators could all improve the efficiency without adversely affecting the driving experience.

f. A. U.S.-Built, SVT-badged Fusion AWD with twincharging and the efficiency technologies listed above.

g. A simple two-seat sports car. Sure the GT was awesome. But 99.9% of Ford lovers will never get to sit in one, much less drive. And the retro-Thunderbird was an expensive, disappointing poser. The Mustang is an essential icon, but it'll never have the bona fides of a true two-seater.

Ford has yielded the "America's Sports Car title to Chevrolet's Corvette for too long. A real "everyperson" sports car can build brand excitement and create technology trickledown. Why should Mazda, Pontiac, Saturn and Honda have all the fun in this segment?

A roadster style car would be the safest choice, but a Fiero/MR2-sized "Junior GT" (with all the "classic" GT-40 styling cues) and a small, transversly-mounted 60-degree turbocharged V8 (using FWD drivetrain bits, just like GM and Toyota) might really shake folks up.

h. Forced-induction ready crate engines (including modulars) in the Ford Racing Performance Parts catalog. It's ironic that Ford's leading high performance engines of this decade (the 4.6 supercharged Cobra engine, the supercharged Ford GT engine and the supercharged GT 500 engine) are not offered by FRPP. It's also ironic that Mustang builders have generally relied for the past twenty years on supercharging and turbocharging to make up the cubic inch deficit to their GM and Mopar competition, but FRPP offers no "power-adder ready" crate engines.

Encouraging more builders to use power-adder friendly FRPP power can't but help perceptions of the Ford brand and brand loyalty among these opinion leaders. As Zora Arkus-Duntov obeserved over five decades ago: hot rodders are going to build hot rods anyway, so the factory can either help them do it right or (by inaction) drive them into the waiting arms of another.