COBRA JETS, BOSS MUSTANGS, SVOs AND T. BOONE PICKENS
As Ford Motor Company’s (tm) stock (Stock symbol: F) settles in a range approaching a one-share-for-a-gallon of gas exchange, a number of conflicting signs are emerging from the Blue Oval’s fun and games sectors:
1. NO MORE DAN DAVIS: On the troubling side, Autoweek is reporting long time FoMoCo racing boss Dan Davis is retiring.
Of course, SVT went in the tank when John Colletti bailed out with his “gold watch” after the Ford GT control-arm recall fiasco. For those fearing a reprise of the infamous and idiotic 1970 abandonment of racing in the U.S.A., the loss of Dan Davis might just be a harbinger of bad, bad, bad times on the horizon.
2. NO BOSS MUSTANG: More troubling is a Jalopnik report that the way-overdue, wide-bore center BOSS V8 may not make it into any Mustangs. The Glass House gang has always toyed with the possibility of a BOSS V8 with all the resolve and vision of Hamlet, directly leading to a market-missing delay of the program.
Now the chance of the BOSS to power future Mustangs is undoubtedly a casualty of FoMoCo’s sad finances, the crushing burden of the increasing Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, and $4.00/gallon fuel costs.
The real tragedy in Ford’s apparent “firing” of the BOSS is that it guarantees that FoMoCo will not have a late-model homologated “big” V8 for any streetable purpose. This will insure that GM’s LSX and Chrysler’s Gen III Hemi will continue to dominate the aftermarket and traditional grassroots hot rodding/amateur motorsports for decades after such engines are “CAFE’d out” of OEM fitments. Remember that about the only way enthusiasts survived the 1970s was by building combinations based on 1960s muscle cars. Yet FoMoCo has selfishly chosen to send its troops into the reprise of the 1970s without a Hemi-sized bullet in the arsenal.
Had FoMoCo homologated the BOSS in the Mustang during the narrow window when such engines would still fit within CAFE’s straightjacket, enthusiasts would have been able to retrofit literally thousands of crate BOSSES into lesser Mustangs, and probably a host of other Fords.
Ford decision to can the BOSS will lead to an increased number of “bastardized” GM LS-into-Mustang swaps over the next two decades, regardless of what the EPA and CARB does. Why? Because until at least a couple of generations of hot rodders die off, relatively large cubic inch engines will remain popular for limited use sporting vehicles, drag racers and hobby performance cars. FoMoCo will be left out.
Sadly, no one with any real power at FoMoCo seems to get “it.”
3. RETURN OF THE SVO: FoMoCo is getting slaughtered in the sub-V8 niche of the performance market.
Ford has “nothing” for buyers considering the EVO, WRX STI, turbo Cobalt SS, Dodge SRT-4 and a number of other mini-turbo cars (excluding a couple of Mazdaspeed offerings). Since the death of the underperforming SVT Focus, FoMoCo has completely and utterly ignored the “tuner/youth market.”
Long ago, Speedzzter suggested a return of the SVO as a standard-bearer for a “tuner-focused” Mustang. A number of sources are claiming that FoMoCo may plug an Eco-Boost engine into a lightened Mustang and call it an SVO in 2010 or so.
What took them so long?
4. RETURN OF THE COBRA JET: Apparently one of the last gasps of the Dan Davis administration at Ford Racing is to revisit the 1968 invasion of the NHRA by the legendary Cobra Jet Mustangs by offering a turn-key factory, not-street-legal FR500CJ pony car for “stock class” drag racing.
According to the Ford Racing press release:
Believe this one when you see it at a strip near you.
If it pans out, hopefully it will stick around longer than the original CJ Mustangs and will lead to an affordable “trickle down” on-road version. (Don’t bet on it).
While Speedzzter is encouraged by FoMoCo’s Porsche-style turn-key race car operations, arguably Ford is still not doing enough to stimulate Ford’s competition fortunes in lower forms of grassroots motorsports. Certainly, Ford Racing isn’t repeating all of the mistakes of the “Total Performance” era (i.e. limiting its focus to professional racing while allowing Chevrolet to steal the streets, strips and dirt bull-rings with cheap over-the-counter speed parts), Ford’s competition program has a huge gap between the minor “pack” bolt-ons and expensive, full-blown, track-only limited production racing cars.
As emission/fuel economy regulations increasingly take their toll on late-model streetable high performance, grassroots enthusiasts will rely more on Ford to homologate street-legal “combinations.” The FR500CJ does nothing to serve the huge street/strip market or to homologate anything for use by anyone who races a dual-purpose machine. So in a way, it does sort of repeat one of the "mistakes" of the "Total Performance" era (ignoring the "real" grassroots -- folks who will never compete at an NHRA national event).
5. THE PICKENS PLAN: Octogenarian oilman T. Boone Pickens – who is most notorious for a series of high profile acquisition moves in the 1980s and, more recently, some record-setting donations to a certain college in the pastures of Oklahoma – is engaging in a high-profile campaign to convert much of America’s electric generation capacity to wind power and divert natural gas into vehicle propulsion.
The Pickens Plan apparently sets up a show-down between the alternative fuel forces of ethanol and compressed natural gas.
The web version of the "Pickens Plan" is not sufficiently detailed on issues relating to the collateral and direct effects of creating a huge, new NGV infrastructure on various forms of recreational motoring, such as grassroots motorsports, automotive hobbies (such as "hot rodding," automobile collecting and vehicle restoration), and power boating.
Presumably, the Pickens Plan (as presented) does not advocate the OEMs converting future high performance vehicles, motorcycles, ATVs, and certain classes of recreational off-road vehicles to NGVs. In fact, the Pickens Plan's focus seemingly fails to even acknowledge such uses of petroleum, notwithstanding that a sizeable and influential minority of Americans hold such special purpose vehicles central to their automotive liberty.
Moreover, the Pickens Plan (as presented) does not seem to endorse any conversion of existing gasoline vehicles (high performance, special interest, or otherwise) to natural gas. It fails to address the the significant and wholly unnecessary regulatory barriers erected by the U.S. EPA, CARB and a handful of similar state environmental agencies to the retrofitting of vehicles manufactured after 1993.
Finally, the Pickens Plan (as presented) does not educate potential supporters as to the "performance benefits" (if any) of natural gas in comparison to any other petroleum alternatives. In contrast, advocates of ethanol and E-85 have selectively used enthusiast media and several motorsports venues (e.g. "Indy Car" racing, Dynomax "Power to the Wheels" competition) to establish the high performance properties of these alternative fuels among the leading edges of the motorsports community, which undoubtedly will pay future dividends in the battle for broader market perception and demand.
These "gaps" in the Pickens Plan are undoubtedly troubling to millions of serious motoring enthusiasts and hobbyists -- who have little interest in supporting the introduction of a new, competing motor fuel unless it promises tangible microeconomic and individualized performance advantages.
Touting a a bland, four-cylinder front-wheel-drive Honda as the prototypical "car of the future" simply will not engage the millions of hands-on, grassroots automotive opinion leaders who comprise the broad and diverse automotive hobby throughout the U.S.
These impassioned automotive hobbyists/motorsports enthusiasts and practitioners are virtually the only consumers paying any attention to the "alternative fuel" debate (other than even smaller numbers of techophile environmentalists (most of whom are skeptical of CNG as a "greenhouse gas" fuel that will delay their ultimate dreams of vehicle electrification and forced mass transit), investors, OEM engineers, environmental regulators, and the discrete and insular energy production community).
The majority of non-automobile enthusiast Americans are vastly ignorant as to automotive technology and see their vehicles as "black box" appliances. To expect a groundswell of support for a "revolution" in motor fuel from people who are not the least bit interested in automobile technology and view their vehicles simply as a commodity is a daunting task. While focus on the macroeconomic and geopolitical implications of oil importation may scare some into action, it will undoubtedly be dismissed as a too-remote, too-abstract clamor by most non-automobile enthusiast Americans.
However, if CNG could be positioned in the minds of professional and grassroots automotive opinion leaders as a clean, abundant, cheap and higher performance alternative motor fuel, this "premium" niche can drive public demand for expansion of the CNG infrastructure. Analogous efforts on other automotive technologies and vehicle marketing plans have been at the heart of the old saying "Win on Sunday; sell on Monday."
A switch to CNG on the scale apparently anticipated by the Pickens Plan presumes a paradigm shift.
One only need to look to automotive history to identify a roughly similar (albeit far more simple) marketing problem. In 1953, GM engineer Zora Arkus-Duntov believed GM was faced with the challenge of making Chevrolet's Corvette and the upcoming 1955 RPO OHV Chevrolet V8 an economically-viable success in a crowded automotive market place. He sent a legendary memorandum to his bosses which outlined, in part, a strategy which GM employed to create a huge paradigm shift in vital opinion-leading segments of motoring. Arkus-Duntov wrote, in part:
Zora Arkus-Duntov, "Thoughts Pertaining to Youth, Hot Rodders, And Chevrolet." (December 16, 1953).
Arkus-Duntov's views were correct and Chevrolet's focus in marketing high performance Corvettes, "Corvette-powered" V8 sedans, and a prodigious selection of over-the-counter performance parts to grassroots hobbyists and lower-level professional motorsports participants ultimately caused a dramatic paradigm shift which affected mass market perceptions and, correspondingly, increased demand for more ordinary Chevrolet products for decades.
The task of a paradigm shift to CNG, of course, is much more daunting than the popularization of Chevrolet's 1955 RPO V8 because of the interrelated retail supply and demand side problems. However, a useful component to increasing public pressure for increased retail-side infrastructure (and government encouragement/subsidy thereof) would be a targeted "demonstration" campaign to focus automotive opinion leaders on the potential localized advantages of CNG. Such a campaign would likely include (in addition to more traditional methods of creating demand/subsidy/participation for infrastructure investment) the following components (This would also work for the Ethanol forces):
1. Obtaining the OEM manufacturing and retail sale of high performance "flex-fuel" CNG vehicles which are programmed to achieve higher levels of performance on CNG (i.e. with computer-controlled turbocharging to take advantage of CNG's purported octane superiority over unleaded gasoline on a flex-fuel basis).
2. High performance CNG conversion demonstration projects by prominent aftermarket engine builders (perhaps culminating in an annual CNG-fueled engine dynamometer competition similar to the popular "JEG's Engine Masters" competition).
3. Aftermarket targeting of high performance CNG conversions/crate engines for the non-emission controlled enthusiast market (i.e. pre-1948 "street rods" and pre-1968 "muscle cars" and replicas), to be followed up with certified CNG conversions for later model high performance vehicles. (U.S. EPA and CARB rules would likely need to be adapted to reduce market-chilling disincentives for conversions of certain emission-controlled high performance and sporting vehicles).
4. Specific targeting of certain grassroots motorsports venues for contingency-based CNG fuel use (this would require working with influential sanctioning bodies on rules modifications and equivalency formulas in a limited number of national, grassroots/semi-professional competition formulae with identified strong analogs to street performance).
5. Obtaining a series of technical stories in popular enthusiast and professional media publications detailing the technology involved in applying CNG to high performance and sport motoring.
The foregoing plan, while not inexpensive or easy, would rapidly build a substantial base of enthusiastic customers for CNG and provide a demand-side base of support for the implementation of a paradigm shift to CNG on a broader basis.
It should strongly be noted that motorsports and the motorsports aftermarket have historically been strong drivers of OEM technological shifts. Merely relying on an OEM-only strategy with no high performance component will dramatically slow any increase in retail demand for CNG, as well as expansion of OEM offerings. However, reliance strictly on aftermarket forces would obviously doom a paradigm shift to failure.
Gasoline has almost a 150 year lead on CNG, a loyal market following, broad public acceptance, and a huge installed base. Overcoming all of this will take an attack plan that is far broader than anything evidenced by the Pickens Plan. The foregoing ideas suggest one alternative to building a niche of market pressure for CNG to overtake gasoline in important, opinion-leading automotive segments and pave the way for a broader paradigm shift.
As Ford Motor Company’s (tm) stock (Stock symbol: F) settles in a range approaching a one-share-for-a-gallon of gas exchange, a number of conflicting signs are emerging from the Blue Oval’s fun and games sectors:
1. NO MORE DAN DAVIS: On the troubling side, Autoweek is reporting long time FoMoCo racing boss Dan Davis is retiring.
Of course, SVT went in the tank when John Colletti bailed out with his “gold watch” after the Ford GT control-arm recall fiasco. For those fearing a reprise of the infamous and idiotic 1970 abandonment of racing in the U.S.A., the loss of Dan Davis might just be a harbinger of bad, bad, bad times on the horizon.
2. NO BOSS MUSTANG: More troubling is a Jalopnik report that the way-overdue, wide-bore center BOSS V8 may not make it into any Mustangs. The Glass House gang has always toyed with the possibility of a BOSS V8 with all the resolve and vision of Hamlet, directly leading to a market-missing delay of the program.
Now the chance of the BOSS to power future Mustangs is undoubtedly a casualty of FoMoCo’s sad finances, the crushing burden of the increasing Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, and $4.00/gallon fuel costs.
The real tragedy in Ford’s apparent “firing” of the BOSS is that it guarantees that FoMoCo will not have a late-model homologated “big” V8 for any streetable purpose. This will insure that GM’s LSX and Chrysler’s Gen III Hemi will continue to dominate the aftermarket and traditional grassroots hot rodding/amateur motorsports for decades after such engines are “CAFE’d out” of OEM fitments. Remember that about the only way enthusiasts survived the 1970s was by building combinations based on 1960s muscle cars. Yet FoMoCo has selfishly chosen to send its troops into the reprise of the 1970s without a Hemi-sized bullet in the arsenal.
Had FoMoCo homologated the BOSS in the Mustang during the narrow window when such engines would still fit within CAFE’s straightjacket, enthusiasts would have been able to retrofit literally thousands of crate BOSSES into lesser Mustangs, and probably a host of other Fords.
Ford decision to can the BOSS will lead to an increased number of “bastardized” GM LS-into-Mustang swaps over the next two decades, regardless of what the EPA and CARB does. Why? Because until at least a couple of generations of hot rodders die off, relatively large cubic inch engines will remain popular for limited use sporting vehicles, drag racers and hobby performance cars. FoMoCo will be left out.
Sadly, no one with any real power at FoMoCo seems to get “it.”
3. RETURN OF THE SVO: FoMoCo is getting slaughtered in the sub-V8 niche of the performance market.
Ford has “nothing” for buyers considering the EVO, WRX STI, turbo Cobalt SS, Dodge SRT-4 and a number of other mini-turbo cars (excluding a couple of Mazdaspeed offerings). Since the death of the underperforming SVT Focus, FoMoCo has completely and utterly ignored the “tuner/youth market.”
Long ago, Speedzzter suggested a return of the SVO as a standard-bearer for a “tuner-focused” Mustang. A number of sources are claiming that FoMoCo may plug an Eco-Boost engine into a lightened Mustang and call it an SVO in 2010 or so.
What took them so long?
4. RETURN OF THE COBRA JET: Apparently one of the last gasps of the Dan Davis administration at Ford Racing is to revisit the 1968 invasion of the NHRA by the legendary Cobra Jet Mustangs by offering a turn-key factory, not-street-legal FR500CJ pony car for “stock class” drag racing.
According to the Ford Racing press release:
The 2008 Ford Racing Cobra Jet Mustang (FR500CJ) will be a factory-built race car, ready for the drag strip with only minor additional prep required of the racer.
The Cobra Jet Mustang (M-FR500-CJ) joins Ford Racing's two successful road racing Mustangs, the M-FR500-C and M-FR500-S, as turn-key race cars available only from Ford Dealers. A limited number of units are under consideration for 2008; the specific number remains TBD.
Ford Racing Part Number: M-FR500-CJ
Vehicle content:
400hp (est.) 5.4L DOHC supercharged engine
6-speed manual transmission standard; optional automatic TBD
NHRA legal to 10.00 second ETs
NHRA Stock Eliminator legal interior
Lightweight – 3,300 lbs (est.)
Unique trim and appearance package
Drag race wheel/tire combination
Cobra Jet graphics package
Program intent:
Provide a Mustang that is a true A Stock competitor
50 units initial build
Off-road only (VIN replaced by serial number)
Estimated pricing, $69,990 (MSRP)
2008MY designation
Built in 12/2008; vehicles delivered 2/2009
Believe this one when you see it at a strip near you.
If it pans out, hopefully it will stick around longer than the original CJ Mustangs and will lead to an affordable “trickle down” on-road version. (Don’t bet on it).
While Speedzzter is encouraged by FoMoCo’s Porsche-style turn-key race car operations, arguably Ford is still not doing enough to stimulate Ford’s competition fortunes in lower forms of grassroots motorsports. Certainly, Ford Racing isn’t repeating all of the mistakes of the “Total Performance” era (i.e. limiting its focus to professional racing while allowing Chevrolet to steal the streets, strips and dirt bull-rings with cheap over-the-counter speed parts), Ford’s competition program has a huge gap between the minor “pack” bolt-ons and expensive, full-blown, track-only limited production racing cars.
As emission/fuel economy regulations increasingly take their toll on late-model streetable high performance, grassroots enthusiasts will rely more on Ford to homologate street-legal “combinations.” The FR500CJ does nothing to serve the huge street/strip market or to homologate anything for use by anyone who races a dual-purpose machine. So in a way, it does sort of repeat one of the "mistakes" of the "Total Performance" era (ignoring the "real" grassroots -- folks who will never compete at an NHRA national event).
5. THE PICKENS PLAN: Octogenarian oilman T. Boone Pickens – who is most notorious for a series of high profile acquisition moves in the 1980s and, more recently, some record-setting donations to a certain college in the pastures of Oklahoma – is engaging in a high-profile campaign to convert much of America’s electric generation capacity to wind power and divert natural gas into vehicle propulsion.
The Pickens Plan apparently sets up a show-down between the alternative fuel forces of ethanol and compressed natural gas.
The web version of the "Pickens Plan" is not sufficiently detailed on issues relating to the collateral and direct effects of creating a huge, new NGV infrastructure on various forms of recreational motoring, such as grassroots motorsports, automotive hobbies (such as "hot rodding," automobile collecting and vehicle restoration), and power boating.
Presumably, the Pickens Plan (as presented) does not advocate the OEMs converting future high performance vehicles, motorcycles, ATVs, and certain classes of recreational off-road vehicles to NGVs. In fact, the Pickens Plan's focus seemingly fails to even acknowledge such uses of petroleum, notwithstanding that a sizeable and influential minority of Americans hold such special purpose vehicles central to their automotive liberty.
Moreover, the Pickens Plan (as presented) does not seem to endorse any conversion of existing gasoline vehicles (high performance, special interest, or otherwise) to natural gas. It fails to address the the significant and wholly unnecessary regulatory barriers erected by the U.S. EPA, CARB and a handful of similar state environmental agencies to the retrofitting of vehicles manufactured after 1993.
Finally, the Pickens Plan (as presented) does not educate potential supporters as to the "performance benefits" (if any) of natural gas in comparison to any other petroleum alternatives. In contrast, advocates of ethanol and E-85 have selectively used enthusiast media and several motorsports venues (e.g. "Indy Car" racing, Dynomax "Power to the Wheels" competition) to establish the high performance properties of these alternative fuels among the leading edges of the motorsports community, which undoubtedly will pay future dividends in the battle for broader market perception and demand.
These "gaps" in the Pickens Plan are undoubtedly troubling to millions of serious motoring enthusiasts and hobbyists -- who have little interest in supporting the introduction of a new, competing motor fuel unless it promises tangible microeconomic and individualized performance advantages.
Touting a a bland, four-cylinder front-wheel-drive Honda as the prototypical "car of the future" simply will not engage the millions of hands-on, grassroots automotive opinion leaders who comprise the broad and diverse automotive hobby throughout the U.S.
These impassioned automotive hobbyists/motorsports enthusiasts and practitioners are virtually the only consumers paying any attention to the "alternative fuel" debate (other than even smaller numbers of techophile environmentalists (most of whom are skeptical of CNG as a "greenhouse gas" fuel that will delay their ultimate dreams of vehicle electrification and forced mass transit), investors, OEM engineers, environmental regulators, and the discrete and insular energy production community).
The majority of non-automobile enthusiast Americans are vastly ignorant as to automotive technology and see their vehicles as "black box" appliances. To expect a groundswell of support for a "revolution" in motor fuel from people who are not the least bit interested in automobile technology and view their vehicles simply as a commodity is a daunting task. While focus on the macroeconomic and geopolitical implications of oil importation may scare some into action, it will undoubtedly be dismissed as a too-remote, too-abstract clamor by most non-automobile enthusiast Americans.
However, if CNG could be positioned in the minds of professional and grassroots automotive opinion leaders as a clean, abundant, cheap and higher performance alternative motor fuel, this "premium" niche can drive public demand for expansion of the CNG infrastructure. Analogous efforts on other automotive technologies and vehicle marketing plans have been at the heart of the old saying "Win on Sunday; sell on Monday."
A switch to CNG on the scale apparently anticipated by the Pickens Plan presumes a paradigm shift.
One only need to look to automotive history to identify a roughly similar (albeit far more simple) marketing problem. In 1953, GM engineer Zora Arkus-Duntov believed GM was faced with the challenge of making Chevrolet's Corvette and the upcoming 1955 RPO OHV Chevrolet V8 an economically-viable success in a crowded automotive market place. He sent a legendary memorandum to his bosses which outlined, in part, a strategy which GM employed to create a huge paradigm shift in vital opinion-leading segments of motoring. Arkus-Duntov wrote, in part:
"The Hot Rod movement and interest in things connected with hop-up and speed is still growing. As an indication: the publications devoted to hot rodding and hop-upping, of which some half dozen have a very large circulation and are distributed nationally, did not exist some six years ago."
"From cover to cover, they are full of Fords. This is not surprising that the majority of hot rodders are eating, sleeping, and dreaming modified Fords. They know Ford parts from stern to stern better than Ford people themselves."
"A young man buying a magazine for the first time immediately becomes introduced to Ford. It is reasonable to assume that when hot rodders or hot rod-influenced persons buy transportation, they buy Fords. As they progress in age and income, they graduate from jalopies to second-hand Fords, then to new Fords."
"Should we consider that it would be desirable to make these youths Chevrolet-minded? I think that we are in a position to carry out a successful attempt. However, there are many factors against us:
- 1.Loyalty and experience with Ford.
- 2.Hop-up industry is geared with Ford.
- 3.Law of number-thousands are and will be working on Fords for active competition.
- 4.Appearance of Ford’s overhead V8, now one year ahead of us."
"When a superior line of GM V8’s appeared, there where remarkably few attempts to develop these, and none too successful. . . ."
"Like all people, hot rodders are attracted by novelty. However, bitter experience has taught them that new development is costly and long, and therefore they are extremely conservative. From my observation, it takes an advanced hot rodder some three years to stumble toward the successful development of a new design. Overhead Fords will be in this stable between 1956 and 1957."
"The slide rule potential of our RPO V8 engine is extremely high, but to let things run their natural course will put us one year behind-and then not too many hot rodders will pick Chevrolet for development. One factor which can largely overcome this handicap would be the availability of ready-engineered parts for higher output."
Zora Arkus-Duntov, "Thoughts Pertaining to Youth, Hot Rodders, And Chevrolet." (December 16, 1953).
Arkus-Duntov's views were correct and Chevrolet's focus in marketing high performance Corvettes, "Corvette-powered" V8 sedans, and a prodigious selection of over-the-counter performance parts to grassroots hobbyists and lower-level professional motorsports participants ultimately caused a dramatic paradigm shift which affected mass market perceptions and, correspondingly, increased demand for more ordinary Chevrolet products for decades.
The task of a paradigm shift to CNG, of course, is much more daunting than the popularization of Chevrolet's 1955 RPO V8 because of the interrelated retail supply and demand side problems. However, a useful component to increasing public pressure for increased retail-side infrastructure (and government encouragement/subsidy thereof) would be a targeted "demonstration" campaign to focus automotive opinion leaders on the potential localized advantages of CNG. Such a campaign would likely include (in addition to more traditional methods of creating demand/subsidy/participation for infrastructure investment) the following components (This would also work for the Ethanol forces):
1. Obtaining the OEM manufacturing and retail sale of high performance "flex-fuel" CNG vehicles which are programmed to achieve higher levels of performance on CNG (i.e. with computer-controlled turbocharging to take advantage of CNG's purported octane superiority over unleaded gasoline on a flex-fuel basis).
2. High performance CNG conversion demonstration projects by prominent aftermarket engine builders (perhaps culminating in an annual CNG-fueled engine dynamometer competition similar to the popular "JEG's Engine Masters" competition).
3. Aftermarket targeting of high performance CNG conversions/crate engines for the non-emission controlled enthusiast market (i.e. pre-1948 "street rods" and pre-1968 "muscle cars" and replicas), to be followed up with certified CNG conversions for later model high performance vehicles. (U.S. EPA and CARB rules would likely need to be adapted to reduce market-chilling disincentives for conversions of certain emission-controlled high performance and sporting vehicles).
4. Specific targeting of certain grassroots motorsports venues for contingency-based CNG fuel use (this would require working with influential sanctioning bodies on rules modifications and equivalency formulas in a limited number of national, grassroots/semi-professional competition formulae with identified strong analogs to street performance).
5. Obtaining a series of technical stories in popular enthusiast and professional media publications detailing the technology involved in applying CNG to high performance and sport motoring.
The foregoing plan, while not inexpensive or easy, would rapidly build a substantial base of enthusiastic customers for CNG and provide a demand-side base of support for the implementation of a paradigm shift to CNG on a broader basis.
It should strongly be noted that motorsports and the motorsports aftermarket have historically been strong drivers of OEM technological shifts. Merely relying on an OEM-only strategy with no high performance component will dramatically slow any increase in retail demand for CNG, as well as expansion of OEM offerings. However, reliance strictly on aftermarket forces would obviously doom a paradigm shift to failure.
Gasoline has almost a 150 year lead on CNG, a loyal market following, broad public acceptance, and a huge installed base. Overcoming all of this will take an attack plan that is far broader than anything evidenced by the Pickens Plan. The foregoing ideas suggest one alternative to building a niche of market pressure for CNG to overtake gasoline in important, opinion-leading automotive segments and pave the way for a broader paradigm shift.
Labels: Boss V8, Cobra Jet, Dan Davis, Drag Racing, Ford Racing, FR500CJ, SVO, SVT, T. Boone Pickens
posted by Editor at 11:44
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