THEY DON'T MAKE 'EM LIKE THEY USED TO

Strikes, that is.

Unlike the storied 67-day 1970 strike of General Motors (GM), the "general strike" of 2007 ended with a whimper after only a couple of days. Under the cover of darkness, somebody blinked, resulting in GM and the United Auto Workers reaching a tentative agreement.

It's an abbreviated denouement for negotiations that UAW prexy Ron Gettelfinger claimed merely two quick rotations of the Earth ago were "one-sided."

Ostensibly, the strike of 2007 was about guarantees of future products at U.S. plants. Yet according to press reports "GM made no specific commitments to build cars and trucks at U.S. factories, but generally agreed that with the reduced costs from the new contract, investment in the plants would work . . . ."

Still, the strike ended after only the briefest of furloughs.

Likely none of GM's striking workers (which, by the way, numbered hundreds of thousands fewer than those participating in the protracted 1970 work stoppage) missed any mortgage or car payments. No children starving on a meager $200 per week strike benefit. No product shortages or stock collapse. Virtually no pain. Except for the shifts that had to show up Monday for the dramatic "job walk-off," it was really nothing more than a long weekend.

Instead of "burning down Detroit," the mini-strike was more like "flicking a Bic at a rock concert." Sure there was the risk of a fire, but nothing meaningful was actually consumed.

Before and during the mini-strike, many industry analysts opined the strike was about conditioning the UAW rank and file to vote for give-backs. Afterward, Mr. Gettelfinger boasted "I think the strike probably helped our side more than theirs."

Yet GM reportedly wrangled a tiered wage structure, "mitigated" the effects of the ridiculous "job bank" (wherein furloughed UAW members get paid for not working), and off-loaded over FIFTY BILLION in "legacy" obligations onto the UAW for nearly a $20 Billion discount.

None of this required a strike to achieve.

The celebrated Volunteer Employee Benefit Association (VEBA), if approved by the rank and file and the government, raises a bundle of questions. Undoubtedly, if it goes poorly (i.e. the UAW cannot hand off its new obligations to a "HillaryCare" bailout, or investments go bad, or costs continue to skyrocket), the UAW will be back in four years (or sooner) for more GM money. Thus, some question whether this really changes things much. How a VEBA results in lower health care costs is unknown. But with a VEBA outsourcing the hard decisions to the union, perhaps GM counts on not facing as much of a backlash from future benefit reductions.

Whatever the result, the UAW is transforming itself into one whale of an insurance company . . . .

As a historical event, this puny strike bookends the smashmouth 1970 walkout in that both touched on the problem of retirement. The 1970 contract included a new pension plan. This one apparently results in the retirees getting a pension increase that's "offset by an equal increase in health care contributions." It's emblematic of the UAW's decline in power over the past thirty years. It is unlikely that this abbreviated "show strike" will do anything to help the UAW organize the transplants and "level the playing field" for the Detroit 3.

Thus, to some, it seems like a rearrangement of the chairs with little prospect for fundamental change. Apparently neither side had the stomach to drive a harder bargain. Whether the pattern contract of 2007 will make Detroit more competitive remains to be seen.