HARDBALL WITH THE UAW OVER THE 2009 F-150

Everyone assumed that the really big fight with the UAW would come during the 2007 "master" contract talks.

But perhaps a little "Spanish Civil War"-type prequel has broken out among Ford Motor Company (tm) and the United Auto Workers union.

MarketWatch is reporting that FoMoCo is "withholding funding commitments for 2009 model-year products" according to unnamed "local union officials and others with knowledge of the company's plans." http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?dist=newsfinder&siteid=google&guid=%7B77013097-8138-4646-AE4A-7DFCC43E04AD%7D&keyword=

Kansas City and Dearborn assembly plants are competiting to see which plant becomes the "lead plant" For the 2009 F-150.

Reportedly the target for the on-going, "plant-by-plant" talks is to get FoMoCo's costs more in line with the Japanese invaders/transplants--namely Toyota.

Unlike the upstart transplants, Ford is saddled with expensive UAW contracts and huge "legacy" costs from an aging workforce and thousands of retirees. The UAW is undoubtedly restless about William Clay Ford, Jr.'s plans to accelerate the "Way Forward" product cuts and plant closings. Thus, both groups of stakeholders have an incentive to find a way to be more competitive.

Unfortunately, the hardball that FoMoCo needs to play to become more competitive could increase the adversarial relationship between company and union. Notwithstanding all of the public relations spin and NASCAR race sponsorships among the Detroit 3 and the UAW, the reality is that an "us versus them" mentality still pervades labor relations.

Except in the public sector, the Labor Movement is on the ropes in the U.S. Most of the truly horrible conditions and exploitation that triggered the Movement over a century ago have passed into history or have been offshored to emerging markets with less permissive and coercive labor organization laws. Labor now is fighting to keep as much of the status quo as possible in an increasingly globalized labor market.

The UAW, in particular, has failed to level the playing field for the Detroit 3 by making inroads into organizing the transplants. In fairness, that failure ought to be reflected in the sorts of contracts the UAW can obtain against Ford, GM and DCX. It probably won't be, but it should be.

The trick is to sell the UAW on a Japanese-style work environment and pattern compensation package, along with concessions on legacy costs. If FoMoCo can do that without totally alienating the rank and file, it will be a bona fide "bold move."

Just don't count on it.

Perhaps a better move for the UAW than hardball in the 2007 pattern negotiations would be to campaign for a limited, automobile industry-specific nationalization of pensions and health care. Such plan would spread out legacy cost across the auto industry and tax the transplants at an equal cost to the Detroit 3. Pitching such a plan as a way to save the U.S. auto industry--as an alternative to bailouts and federal loan guaranties -- instead of just another liberal scheme to "backdoor" universal coverage for everyone, might make such a plan more viable to moderate "swing" elements in the political system. Including various "choice" elements in it might also pick off a few wobbly conservatives.

Don't count on that, either.