FORD MOTOR COMPANY HAS WASTED MUSTANG'S PERIOD OF EXCLUSIVITY

Since 2002, Ford Mustang has been about the only choice for fans of traditional and affordable RWD four-seat sports cars. Since then, rally homologation cars, FWD sport compacts and near-luxury sports sedans have eroded the "Pony car" market.

FoMoCo has played it somewhat conservatively. The retro-styled 2005 Mustang broke almost no new ground, but it was inoffensive to the legions of hot rodders and grassroots racers who depend on Detroit-style pony cars for their automotive exploits. other than the upcoming GT500, the 2003-2004 SVT Cobra, and perhaps the rare and expensive Ford Racing "Boy Racer," FoMoCo has not "pushed the envelope" on performance.

Nor has Ford done much of anything to blend high performance with reasonable fuel efficiency. While Chevrolet boasts of 400 h.p. 6.0 liter Corvettes getting 28 m.p.g., the fuel economy of Ford's Modular-powered Mustangs pales in comparison. FoMoCo has failed to adopt proven fuel-saving, performance-friendly technologies, such as:

· six- or seven-speed transmissions,

· deep overdrives,

· auxilliary gear splitters (which would allow an "economy" final drive ratio for ordinary street use and a "lower" gear for competition and performance duty),

· cylinder deactivation,

· V-Tec-style variable valve lift and duration,

· variable-runner intake manifolds,

· tubular exhaust headers,

· direct fuel injection,

· flex-fuel systems with enhanced programming for E-85, and

· turbocharging.

Although FoMoCo has increased cooperation with the aftermarket, it has done little to make Mustang more user-friendly for the 20+ percent of Mustang owners who modify their cars.

The modern performance era was founded, in part, on the easy-to-modify 5.0 Mustangs of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 5.0 took to forced induction and other "bolt-ons" like bears take to honey. But since the beginning of the Modular era, Ford simply hasn't established the Modular as "the engine" in performance circles. And Ford's relentless cost-cutting has left the garden-variety Modular-powered Mustang generally unsuitable for more than token levels of nitrous oxide, turbocharging or supercharging, unless extensive and expensive internal modifications are performed.

Ford Racing Performance Parts (FRPP) doesn't even sell ONE crate engine (modular or otherwise) that will reliably live with more than 6-8 lbs of boost out of the box. [UPDATE--The FRPP crate engine situtation apparently has greatly improved with the introduction of the "Aluminator" in 2007!] And neither the milestone 2003-2004 Cobra engine or the supercharged 5.4 2V Lightning are offered over-the-counter. Other than uber-expensive GTs and GT500s, Ford offers virtually nothing for the serious power adder enthusiast

Similarly, FoMoCo has not encouraged use of superior-breathing DOHC 4V heads, especially on the majority of Mustangs originally equipped with restrictive SOHC 2V heads.

GM's continued development of the larger LSx series pushrod engines and DCX's Hemis both seem to generate a strong aftermarket following. In some segments, such as street rodding, grassroots circle track racing, marine, and repowering of "classic cars," the Modular engine is a minimal player.

Despite this, Mustang has flourished in cloisters of "Ford-only" racing, albeit the "old school" pushrod engines (mostly built entirely from non-Ford aftermarket parts) still predominate.
FoMoCo simply has not used its current period of exclusivity to convert GM, DCX and import fans into solid Mustangers.

Soon DCX's Hemi-powered Dodge Challenger and GM's 2009 Camaro will bring larger, and highly sophisticated (albeit 2V pushrod) powerplants to market in competitively-styled and priced forms.

Ford seemingly has blown its chance to expand and to solidify its leadership in this crucial, opinion-leading segment.

IT’S NOT THE FIRST TIME FOMOCO HAS BLOWN A HUGE LEAD IN GRASSROOTS MOTORSPORTS

At least FoMoCo’s mishandling of the Mustang, the Modular V8s and FRPP is consistent with FoMoCo’s often clueless choices in grassroots performance niches.

In 1932, Ford introduced the monoblock V8 engine to the low-priced mass market. Ford's flathead V8 was "the standard" grassroots motorsports powerplant in the 1940s and early 1950s.

When GM released the first of the high-compression Kettering V8s (Olds and Cadillac), the flathead was challenged but not toppled. Chrysler's early hemi also emerged as a contender, but the new OHV V8s were not universally accepted by grassroots Hot rodders for a variety of reasons.

Hudson, Oldsmobile and Offenhauser dominated "professional" racing in the USA at the time. Chevy was an old man's car then, saddled with nothing but inline sixes derided as "Stovebolts."

Ford's first OHV V8--the infamous Y-Block--beat the SBC to market by a year, but it was not easily retrofited into earlier Fords. Few high performance parts were available. It also suffered from a somewhat odd design.

Ed Cole--an engineering genius-- was busy in Chevrolet's camp, working on the new "small block" Chevrolet V8 (the "SBC"). Admittedly, the Chevy design was cheaper, lighter and simpler than the Y-Block, the Olds, the Hemis and the Cadillac. It also would also easily swap in place of a flathead.

But the real key to the SBC's success began with Zora Arkus-Duntov, another engineering and marketing genius who was attracted to GM by the new Corvette. (incidentally, Zora had first made a name for himself in the aftermarket by producing a bolt-on OHV Hemi head for Ford's Flathead V8 known as the ArDun. FoMoCo, of course, failed to take any notice of Zora's genius)Zora believed that to save the floundering Corvette, the factory had to supply performance parts for the new "RPO V8." (Perhaps more instrumental in saving the Corvette was the introduction of Ford's Thunderbird in 1955 --an event which bought Zora time enough to implement his V8 plans)

Chevrolet also jumped into factory-sponsored racing with the Corvette and the "Motoramic" '55 Chevrolet. Although it had few successes, its exploits were heavily promoted in advertising. Chrysler's Hemi was starting to dominate stock car racing, but Ford created a racing organization which became the foundation for much of what we take for granted in NASCAR today. However, the Ford approach was always geared to directly supporting a limited number of professional racers with specialized racing parts and cash.

In 1957, Ford was well on its way to winning the "Grand National" Championship (even the legendary Smokey Yunick wrenched for Ford during part of '57) when GM's president proposed a BAN on factory-sponsored racing and speed contests through an automobile manufacturers' association. Ford's boss, Henry Ford II, was duped into signing on to the ban. He immediately killed the racing program. The leftovers survived as the Holman-Moody Company.

It didn't help that Ford's right hand man at the time was the stodgy Robert McNamara. McNamara--who later plunged us deeper into Vietnam as John Kennedy's secretary of defense--didn't understand high performance and dreamed of more sensible cars like the 1960 Ford Falcon, and of smaller front-wheel-drive models. Volkswagen, not Corvette, interested McNamara.

Chevy's in-house racers, such as Zora and Vince Piggins, took advantage of corporate bureaucracy to "keep the back door open." They kept on developing thinly-veiled racing parts, many of which were sold at cheap prices to grassroots racers.

Both Ford and Chevy introduced "big block" engines in the late 50s. Ford's superior "FE" spelled the end of development for the already dated Y-Block. Ford racers were forced to switch architectures twice in less than ten years. But Zora hated Chevy's heavy "W" truck motor and focused most of the development money on the Corvette-friendly SBC.

The Racing Ban was a notorious failure. Pontiac's Bunkie Knudsen openly and obviously cheated on it. Without serious factory competition, Pontiacs began rampaging at the strip and on the oval track. MoPar ramped up activity in NHRA, mainly through a group of factory engineers called "the Ramchargers." Zora and Vince kept pumping out large quantities of "special" parts for Corvettes. Bill Mitchell funded a SBC-powered "Sting Ray" racing sports car out of his own pocket. It was merely a new body hiding a stillborn factory racer Zora built before the Ban. Mitchell's design later became the basis for the 1963-67 Corvette Stingray.

In 1962, after being rebuffed by Enzo Ferrari and seeing how he'd been duped in 1957, Henry Ford II publically repudiated the Racing Ban. Thus began the most incredible factory assault on motorsports the world had ever seen. From 1962-1970 FoMoCo paid an all-star professional cast millions to win for the Blue Oval. Before it was over, Ford, or Ford-associated operations such as Shelby American, had won virtually every major motorsports championship. And the Ford-funded Cosworth DFV V8 became the dominant international open-wheel competition engine for another decade after that.

But in 1963, GM's board reigned in its Racing Ban cheating--somewhat. Overt efforts, such as at Pontiac and the emerging responses to Ford and MoPar at Chevrolet were killed. One survivor was the MARK II/MARK IV V8, a loose revision of Chevrolet's failed "W" motor. This 1963 "mystery motor," also known as the "Porcupine" and later as the "Semi-Hemi" and the "Rat," was first developed to beat Ford's FE 427, Pontiac's 421 and MoPar's Max Wedge/Ramcharger 426 RB wedge.

Prevented from openly supporting professional competition, Zora and Vince kept Chevy's back door parts operation open. Chevrolet also expanded its marine operations. It covertly funded Jim Hall's revolutionary Chaparral Can-Am racers. It debugged the Rat's design and even cast a few Rats in aluminum. It evaded corporate edicts through enterprising dealers like Don Yenko, Baldwin-Motion and Fred Gibb with a gaping loophole called Central Office Production Orders (COPO). In other words, the in-house racers at Chevy went underground.

After nearly a decade of "Total Performance" success (mostly at the professional level), Henry Ford II became concerned by the safety-emissions regulatory storm brewing in Washington D.C. and his responsibility to Ford's shareholders. After some turbulent hearings by a Congressional committee, Henry reacted by slashing the racing program. When Henry fired Bunkie Knudsen (who had left GM after being bypassed for promotion), Ford lost its biggest racing fan. Lee Iacocca was then all too ready to purge "Knudsen" loyalists, many of which shared Knudsen's passion for motorsports and to strictly execute Henry's hasty retreat on factory racing and high performance.

Thus, in November 1970, Ford killed its racing and "Muscle Parts" programs. Ford's largest domestic competitor at the tracks -- Chrysler-- also severely cut back its sponsorships and then killed the Hemi. An era was over.

When the racing door shut at Ford, it slammed--except for modest foreign operations organized by brilliant Public Affairs VP Walter Hayes and a bit of truck racing in Baja. Without a clandestine infrastructure such as Zora and Vince had built to support the Corvette and no powerful champions arguing for selling parts to the grassroots, Ford's performance and racing reputation was in freefall. Some of the in-house racers survived at Ford. Others, such as Jack Roush, ended up outside the corporate mainstream.

The professional racers Ford and MoPar had paid now needed to find other ways to fund their race teams. Some switched immediately to Chevy because of cheaper parts. Other waited until the supplies of Ford and MoPar racing parts dwindled. Still, almost all of the

The flood of Chevy parts Zora and Vince had nurtured, some shrewd under-the-table deals, and favorable rules changes by major sanctioning bodies combined to give Chevrolet over a decade of free reign in oval track racing.

In the minor-leagues, GM made the only "full frame" midsized cars (except for some huge "midsize" Fords from 1972-1979) and the small-track rulesmakers, pursuing cheaper "junkyard formulas" not far removed from the days of the flatheads, didn't accommodate Ford and MoPar racers as much as NASCAR had in the 1960s. In combination with the "half frame" Camaro/Nova (an idea first used by Holman and Moody) on the short tracks, it was advantage: Chevrolet.

At the strip, Chevy edged Ford in the sportsman classes, mainly on the strength of its grassroots parts operation, better parts interchangability, harsh factoring decisions, well-placed assistance deals, and the continued success of its Mustang-fighter--the Camaro. Of course, FoMoCo had a few successes in the Pro Stock ranks with Bob Glidden, the team of Dyno Don Nicholson and Jon Kaase, and the team of Wayne Gapp and Jack Roush. Yet the overall trend was toward Chevrolet in the doorslammer ranks. And even Bob Glidden abandoned the Blue Oval for a short stint with Chrysler at the end of the 1970s.

After the muscle car era ended in an early '70s haze of emission laws, inflation and insurance surcharges, grassroots street rodding reemerged. The SBC quickly became the dominant power source in pre-'48 rods, based on the vast supply of junkyard engines and ease of fitting one in place of an obsolete flathead. Chevrolet helped this trend by aggressively marketing the "Targetmaster" crate engine--not a performance engine out of the box, but one which immediately doubled the power of a Flathead at a cheap price and that could benefit from 30+ years of racing parts development.

It also didn't help that from 1973-1982, Ford offered no real high performance street car and little in factory performance parts. By 1981, the few professionals left running Fords in US competition were reportedly scrounging junkyards in Australia for useable Cleveland heads. Ford's most prolific answer to the SBC, the Windsor-series V8s, were commonly saddled with parts that ordinary hot rodders viewed as unsuitable for high performance--cast cranks, two-bolt mains, and highly-restrictive cast iron heads.

The irony is while Chevrolet never won LeMans outright four times in a row or even one Formula One race or produced any outrageous engines like the Boss 429, Boss 302, SOHC 427, 427 High-Riser, 427 Tunnel-Port or the Boss 351, its little backdoor "Corvette parts" operation effectively trumped Ford's huge lead among grassroots hot rodders and racers.

Although Ford's done a lot since 1981 to catch up, it's still a Chevy world for most rodders and performance enthusiasts. One wonders had Ford nurtured its motorsports business in the grassroots of the sport consistently from the 1940s whether Chevy would now even be a blip on the screen.

Chevy has done such a great job flooding the world with cheap parts that some morons rip out perfectly-buildable and interesting Brand-X engines for a GMPP crate lump! FoMoCo’s failure to adequately serve the street rod, sports car, grassroots circle track and sportsman drag racing markets for about 30 years, squandered the huge lead built by the flathead and gave GM free reign to dominate most consumer performance segments, other than pony cars.

Old speed equipment companies keep promoting the SBC and now the "new" LS-series small blocks because they've already done the R&D necessary and have made their huge investment "bets" on GM parts. Considering that it probably costs $100,000 to develop, pattern and cast up a new intake manifold or cylinder head, preserving the status quo makes some business sense. The death of traditional local speed shops in favor of homogenized discount mail order stores further stifles creativity and innovation.

And even in the four-cylinder "tuner" ranks, FoMoCo is sadly repeating its myopic history. Honda took the early lead because its common and cheap DOHC fours were available or could be retrofitted into affordable vehicles of interest to youths

In contrast, Ford's mass market fours of the 1980s and early 1990s were generally unattractive for performance work (the obsolete pushrod 2V 2.3 HSC and the 2V CHV are notable examples) or were completely undeveloped for performance work (e.g the pre-Zetec 4V Escort engines sold in the U.S.A. ) The limited "mini-stock" circle track success of the OHC 2V "Lima" 2.3, the recent USAC Zetec Focus Midget program and the ancient European "Kent" four used for "Formula Ford" competition are notable, albeit limited exceptions to the general trend.

But after years of similar, if not worse floundering, GM has settled on the global "Ecotec" architecture and is aggressively promoting it in lower-level motorsports. GM also is installing high-performance "power adder" Ecotecs in a wide variety of cars, including the Pontiac Solstice GXP. Even as Speedzzter is composing this essay, GMPP has a phalanx of "Ecotec"-powered race cars assaulting the record-books at the annual Bonneville Speedweeks on the salt flats in Wendover, Utah. Ecotecs have already established two class records in 2006, with more in sight.

Other than the underdeveloped SVO Mustang and the uncompetitive SVT Focus, FoMoCo has seldom produced a "performance" four. And the shift to Mazda’s Duratec basically kills any momentum built up by the Zetec-series engines.

FoMoCo’s abject failure to recognize what Zora Arkus-Duntov did in his historic 1953 memorandum – that grassroots performance enthusiasts need OEM help or they will never adopt a "new" powerplant – is directly responsible for FoMoCo being an "also ran" on the streets, local oval tracks and drag strips of America.

And this sad history just keeps repeating itself.

[note: portions of the foregoing analysis were previously published by in 2005 by Speedzzter (under another name)]